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We use administrative data from the unemployment insurance system of the Sate of Washington 
to study the magnitude of the wage differential associated with work in the temporary services 
industry. We ﬁnd that temp wage rates are 15% to 20% below the levels that might have been 
expected based on trends during other periods in workers’ careers even after controlling for differ-
ences between temps and other workers. Comparing temp wages to wages immediately before 
and after temp work or to the wages on non-temp jobs begun during the same period as workers 
were in the temp industry yields estimates of the temp work penalty as low as 10%.1
I. Introduction
Employment in the temporary services industry has grown very rapidly over the last quarter cen-
tury. Indeed, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Current Employment Survey 
(CES), the industry’s employment has increased at an annual rate of over 11 percent since 1972, 
bringing its share of total U.S. employment from essentially zero to over two percent. This rapid 
growth has raised concerns because many view temporary service positions as “bad jobs.” For 
instance, CES data show that average hourly earnings for production and nonsupervisory workers 
in the industry are 25% or more below national averages.1 However, such simple comparisons fail 
to account for what may be substantial differences in skill levels and other factors between tempo-
rary services workers and those employed in other industries, a defect that we attempt to remedy 
in this paper.
From at least one perspective, a wage penalty for temporary services work would be surprising. 
Temporary services workers – hereafter “temps”– bear more risk of unemployment than other 
workers and one might reasonably expect that risk to be compensated by higher wages. The 
industry’s workers, who overwhelmingly work under the direction of client ﬁrms on what are 
often short assignments, usually have no guarantee that they will be offered further work when 
those assignments are complete. As a result, temps are more likely than other workers to face 
unemployment or fewer than desired hours of work. For instance, in previous work (Segal and 
Sullivan (1997)) using matched data from Current Population Surveys, we found that temps were 
more than twice as likely (6.5% versus 2.6%) as other workers to be unemployment a year later 
and that in a given week they were four times as likely (20% versus 5%) to ﬁnd themselves invol-
untarily working part time. As observers since Adam Smith have noted, workers, such as those in 
the construction trades, facing similar risks often earn compensating differentials.2
Of course, temps differ from construction and other workers who may receive compensating dif-
ferentials for unemployment risk in a number of dimensions. In particular, unionization is virtu-
ally nonexistent in the temporary services industry. More generally, the typically very short job 
1. Moreover, in previous work using the BLS’s Current Population Survey (CPS) (Segal and Sullivan 
(1997)), we have shown that temps are much less likely to receive beneﬁts such as health insurance from 
their employers.
2. For Smith’s analysis see Book I, Chapter 10 of The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1937). 
For some evidence on compensating differentials for unemployment risk see, for example, Abowd and Ash-
enfelter (1981) and Topel (1984).2
tenures of temps preclude the formation of groups of “insiders” along the lines of Lindbeck and 
Snower (1988). Without the kind of bargaining power unionization or the existence of entrenched 
insiders brings, temps may not be able to capture compensation for unemployment risk. Of 
course, this would run counter to the standard theory of compensating differentials which assumes 
a competitive labor market.
If temps do suffer a wage penalty, one explanation may be that it is compensated for by a positive 
and more salient job amenity – increased acquisition of human capital. Though, many critics of 
the temporary services industry claim that temp work not only is undesirable in the short term 
because of low current wages, but even more undesirable in the long term because its short job 
spells are inconducive to on-the-job training, industry advocates maintain that temps receive a 
good deal of training.3 This latter view is supported by some survey evidence reported in Krueger 
(1993) and by Bureau of Labor Statistics data analyzed in Autor (1998). A large portion of the 
training provided by temporary services ﬁrms is in general skills, for instance in the use of com-
puter software.4 In addition to technical skills, temp workers may be able to acquire useful infor-
mation about how well suited they are to a particular ﬁeld, knowledge that is harder to obtain in 
conventional jobs. It is thus entirely possible that per unit of time worked, temps acquire more 
human capital that most other workers, a long-term advantage that may offset the short-term dis-
advantage of lower wages and beneﬁts. From this perspective, whether temps earn positive or neg-
ative wage differentials depends on the importance of two partially offsetting job amenities: 
increased risk of unemployment versus more rapid accumulation of general human capital.
As we noted above, simple comparisons of temp worker wages to those of workers in other indus-
tries may not be indicative of true wage differentials associated with temp work. Temp workers 
differ from the norm in a number of dimensions. For instance, they are typically younger, more 
likely to be women, and are less likely to have a college degree, factors associated with lower 
wage rates.5 In previous papers (Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997)) we presented evidence suggest-
ing that a signiﬁcant part of the wage gap between temps and other workers was due to differences 
3. See, for example, NATSS (1994, 1996a, and 1996b).
4. Autor (1998) notes that the fact that much of the general training is provided upfront, before temps go on 
assignments for their employers, presents a challenge for some versions of the theory of human capital 
because workers could choose to take the training without ultimately accepting any assignments, leaving the 
temporary services ﬁrm without anyway to recoup its training expenses.
5. See, for example, Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997).3
in various observable worker characteristics, as well as to other characteristics of jobs such as 
part-time status and coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, we found that 
when we controlled for worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects that the estimated wage penalty associated 
with temp work dropped to around 3%.
However, the above results relied on a matched CPS outgoing rotation group sample in which the 
identiﬁcation of temp status was problematic because of the frequency with which temp workers 
misreport their industry. This problem of measurement error in the temp indicator was likely 
exacerbated in the ﬁxed effect speciﬁcations since the fact that workers are only observed twice, 
one year apart, implies that the effects of measurement error are ampliﬁed relative to both levels 
regressions and ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations with more than two time periods. We argued that the 
relatively high frequency of transitions between temp and perm work reduced the possible magni-
tude of this bias. Nevertheless, the issue of how much of the temp-perm wage gap is explained by 
worker characteristics is worth revisiting.
In this paper, we use a new data source, administrative ﬁles from the Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) system of the state of Washington, to study the effect of temporary services employment on 
workers’ wages and earnings. As we discuss further below, administrative data has a number of 
important advantages for studying these issues. These include large sample sizes and long and 
complete records of workers’ career histories. There are also disadvantages. Most importantly, we 
have no demographic or occupational information about the workers we study, which means that 
we cannot study how results differ according to workers’ occupation, a factor we found to be 
important in our previous work.
We ﬁnd that temp wage rates are 15% to 20% below the levels that might have been expected 
based on trends during other periods in workers’ careers even after controlling for differences 
between temps and other workers. However, we also ﬁnd that the periods in which workers take 
jobs in the temporary services industry tend to be ones in which their wages likely would have 
been lower in non-temp jobs as well. Comparing temp wages to wages immediately before and 
after temp work or to the wages on non-temp jobs begun during the same period as workers were 
in the temp industry yields lower estimates of the temp work differential. In the latter case the dif-
ferential is approximately -10%.4
II. Data
The primary data source for this paper is a 10% sample of quarterly wage records from Washing-
ton State covering the years 1984 to 1994. This sample was created as part of the Continuous 
Wage and Beneﬁt History (CWBH) program that collected Unemployment Insurance (UI) data 
from several states for late 1970s and early 1980s.6 Of the states that participated in the original 
CWBH program, Washington is one of the few to have continued to create data samples for use by 
researchers. Moreover, to our knowledge, Washington is the only state that provides administra-
tive data on hours of work.
Each quarter, employers covered by the state’s UI system are required to report total earnings and 
hours worked for each of their employees. The main categories of workers not covered are the 
self-employed and federal government workers. Our 10% sample of these records is based on the 
last two digits of workers’ Social Security Numbers (SSN). This ﬁle, which includes worker and 
ﬁrm IDs, the four digit SIC code of the employer, and worker earnings and hours, contains nearly 
100 million records. Large sample sizes are very helpful because temporary service workers are 
still only a small fraction of the labor force. Using the SIC code on the UI administrative data, we 
are able to identify about 1,400 temporary services workers in the ﬁrst quarter of 1984, a ﬁgure 
that rises to over 6,000 by the last quarter of 1994.7
Using the UI data allows us to follow workers’ careers at a quarterly frequency over an eleven 
year span from 1984 to 1994. Thus we are able to observe workers’ wages for signiﬁcant periods 
before and after their period of temporary services employment. We also get a nearly complete 
record of workers’ employment relationships. This is important because temporary services jobs 
are frequently second jobs and thus would be missed in data sources that only record workers’ pri-
mary jobs. Finally, because the records are used to compute beneﬁt eligibility and levels, mea-
surement errors are likely to be fewer than in survey data sources in which inaccuracies have no 
consequences for those reporting the data.
6. See, for example, Anderson and Meyer (1994).
7. Temporary services ﬁrms are those with SIC code 7362 up until 1986. In 1987 and after they are in SIC 
7363 along with employee leasing ﬁrms also known as Professional Employer Organizations, or PEOs. As 
we discuss below, the mismeasurement caused by the possible confusion of leased and temporary workers is 
likely to be minimal in Washington State.5
There are, of course, also drawbacks to using administrative data. As already mentioned, a major 
one is the lack of any demographic or occupational information on workers. We compensate for 
the lack of the typical human capital controls in our wage equations by relying on the longitudinal 
nature of our data to estimate models with ﬁxed effects and individual-speciﬁc time trends. Such 
strategies should eliminate most sources of bias in our estimates of wage differentials. However, 
lack of demographic and occupational data does prevent us from determining whether our results 
for temporary services wage gaps differ according to workers’ age, race, sex, or occupation, the 
latter being a factor we found in previous work to make a signiﬁcant difference to estimated wage 
differentials and mobility patterns.8 
Another difﬁculty associated with the use of administrative data is the lack of any direct means of 
distinguishing between cases in which workers are unemployed for a full quarter, are working in 
the uncovered sector, are working under another social security number, or have moved out of 
state. All of these possibilities result in there being no record for the worker’s SSN in a particular 
quarter. For our analysis of average wage rates, this inability to distinguish missing data from 
truly zero earnings does not represent a major problem. However, we also present some evidence 
on total earnings levels associated with temp work whose interpretation depends on how we treat 
the lack of a wage record.
Yet another difﬁculty is that although ﬁrms are required to report hours, in practice they some-
times do not. In fact, about 8% of quarterly wage records do not report positive hours. Unfortu-
nately, temporary services ﬁrms fail to report hours information about three times more often than 
this overall rate. Without valid information on hours we are unable to compute an average wage 
rate and thus cannot use such observations in wage comparison models. If the true wage rates 
associated with these missing observations were very different from the norm, our results would 
be potentially misleading. We know of no reason to think that these missing wage rates would be 
unusual. Missing hours data, however, is more common when earnings levels are low, probably 
indicating that job tenure was very short.
8. Segal and Sullivan (1995, 1997) found signiﬁcant differences between white-collar, pink-collar and blue-
collar temps. For example, for white collar workers, the wage penalty associated with temp work was less 
and temps were more likely to remain temps one year later. For blue-collar workers, the wage penalty was 
larger and temps were less likely top remain temps a year later. Results for pink-collar temps were generally 
in between those for white- and blue-collar temps.6
Finally, despite the fact that these data are used for administrative purposes, what appear to be 
keypunch or other errors do occur. For instance, very high or very low implied wage rates are 
sometimes observed as are cases in which earnings rise then fall by a factor of ten or more over a 
three quarter period, suggesting that a decimal place was shifted. We excluded from our analyses 
cases that appear to be measurement errors.
Table 1 shows the growth of temporary services employment levels and employment shares in 
Washington State and nationally. The rate of growth of temporary services employment in Wash-
ington has been slightly faster than that of the nation as a whole, but the pattern over time is fairly 
similar. The shares of employment accounted for by the industry in Washington State, which are 
shown in Figure 1, are also reasonably similar to those for the nation.9 This is reassuring since it 
suggests that our ﬁndings for Washington State may generalize to the nation as a whole. More evi-
dence in this regard comes from Washington State Department of Employment Security (1997) 
which compares the occupational shares in temporary help supply in the Seattle metropolitan area 
to those for the nation as a whole using the BLS’s Occupational Compensation Survey: Tempo-
rary Help Supply Services for 1989 and 1994. They ﬁnd that employment shares for most occupa-
tions in Seattle are similar to those of the nation. In particular, shares in executive, administrative 
and managerial; sales and marketing; and clerical and administrative support are very similar, 
though shares for professional specialty and technical and related support are somewhat higher 
than nationally, while those for blue-collar occupations are somewhat lower.
A ﬁnal difference between Washington State and the rest of the nation is the lower fraction of 
leased workers in SIC 7363. The SIC 7363 category contains both temporary services ﬁrms and 
employee leasing ﬁrms, also known as professional employer organizations (PEOs). This latter 
group of ﬁrms assume the existing work forces of other ﬁrms, performing all the administrative 
work associated with employing workers, such as writing pay checks and paying taxes, but have 
no role in recruiting or training workers. Their employees are typically long-term workers tied to 
the ﬁrms they are leased to. Since our interest is in temporary services employment, we view it as 
9. The somewhat higher fractions shown for Washington State may be partially due to the fact that the rates 
are for work some time in a quarter while those for the nation are for work some time in a month. Because 
turnover in the industry is especially high, fractions of workers employed in the industry rise relatively rap-
idly with the length of time interval. For instance, in other work (Segal and Sullivan 1997), we have found 
that the fraction of workers employed some time during a two year interval is approximately 5% in Washing-
ton State.7
a plus that the 1992 Census of Services Industries reported that only about 3% of SIC 7363 work-
ers in Washington are leased, compared to about 23% nationally.10 
III. Effects of Temp Work on Wages
In this section we present our evidence on the magnitude of temp wage differentials using the 
Washington State administrative data. As noted above, aberrant data values occasionally occur 
that would tend to obscure the main message in the data. So we eliminated observations that 
seemed likely to be mistakes.11 In particular, we eliminated observations with quarterly hours 
above 1,040 (= 13 times 80), quarterly earnings above $50,000, average hourly wages below $1 or 
above $100, or which implied an hourly wage that is a factor of ten or more away from a worker’s 
average over the whole 1984-1994 period. In order to keep the computations manageable we also 
limited the data on workers who were never temps to a 10% sample. The resulting data set, in 
which dollar ﬁgures were converted to real 1990 levels using the standard CPI-U, had about 8.9 
million observations.
As noted above, our empirical strategy is to control for differences between temps and other 
workers by estimating models containing individual-speciﬁc constants and time trends. However, 
to facilitate comparisons to unadjusted differences in means we begin by presenting estimates of 
the following simple statistical model:
(1)
where   is the log of the wage for worker   in job   in quarter  , the   are ﬁxed effects for cal-
endar quarters,   is a dummy variable that is one when the worker is employed by a temporary 
services ﬁrm and zero otherwise,   is the impact of temp work, and   is an error term with the 
usual ideal properties. The   control for the tendency of wages to grow over time as well as sea-
sonal patterns and recessions. Otherwise, however, model (1) is equivalent to a cross-sectional 
difference in mean wages between temps and other workers. 
10. Washington State Department of Employment Security (1997).
11. Though outliers appear in administrative data, one advantage is that they tend to be extremely wild outli-
ers that are easy to distinguish from valid data and thus outlier bounds can be set quite wide.
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The estimate of   in model (1) (shown in the top-left of Table 2) is -0.391 (with a standard error of 
0.002).12 This difference, which in terms of simple percentages translates into a 47.8% wage dif-
ferential, is signiﬁcantly larger than those found in national CES data for production workers. One 
reason may be the inclusion of non-production workers. Almost all temps count as production 
workers in the CES, but in other industries, 20% or more of the highest paid workers are elimi-
nated from the CES. However, it seems likely that the true, cross-sectional difference is at least 
somewhat higher in Washington State than nationally.
As we have noted, temps differ from other workers in numerous dimensions, so estimates of 
model (1) are unlikely to capture the true wage differential associated with temp work. Any per-
manent differences in the characteristics of temp and other workers can be controlled for by esti-
mating a standard ﬁxed-effect speciﬁcation:
(2)
which differs from (1) by the inclusion of separate constants for each worker. The effects of any 
variables which, for a given worker, do not change over time, would be absorbed into these 
worker-speciﬁc constants. The estimate of   in model (2) (shown in the middle row of Table 2) of 
-0.167 (standard error 0.002) is considerably smaller than that for model (1). This must reﬂect the 
fact that workers who hold temp jobs typically have lower earnings even when they are employed 
in other industries.
By holding constant any unchanging, individual-speciﬁc differences between temps and other 
workers, model (2) comes closer to capturing the true wage differential associated with temp 
work. However, it may not go far enough. There may be other unobserved differences between 
temps and other workers that are not constant over time. If these differences are changing at a 
nearly constant rate over time, however, they may be accounted for by a model containing individ-
ual-speciﬁc time trends in addition to individual-speciﬁc constants:
12. The standard errors shown in Table 2 are probably somewhat optimistic. In particular, if in contrast to the 
ideal assumption made about the error term in model (1), there are error components that are common to all 
jobs in a quarter of a given type – i.e. temp and other – then the estimated standard errors in Table 2 are too 
small. However, when we limit ourselves to a data set in which all temp jobs are averaged together to form a 
single observation and all perm jobs are averaged together to form another observation, and re-estimate the 
analogue of model (1), we obtain very similar point estimates and estimated standard errors that are only 
about 25% higher than those in Table 2 (though the 0.002s do change to 0.003s after rounding). We prefer to 
work with the data set in which observations correspond to jobs because it facilitates the estimation of some-
what richer models below.
g
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(3)
which differs from (2) by the inclusion of individual-speciﬁc time slopes.
Because of our lack of the standard human capital controls, it may be especially important to 
employ model (3). For instance, the standard human capital speciﬁcation would include a qua-
dratic in experience and experience squared, or equivalently (in this context) age and age squared:
(4)
where   is worker  ’s age at time  . However, if the worker’s birth date is   then  . 
Substituting this relation into (4) introduces worker-speciﬁc time trends:
(5)
Model (3) has been found by Heckman and Hotz (1989) to yield improved nonexperimental esti-
mates of training programs and by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a) to be useful in the 
analysis of data similar to that employed here.
The estimate of   based on model (3) (shown in the bottom row of Table 2) – -0.152 (standard 
error 0.002) – is slightly lower in magnitude than that based on ﬁxed effects alone. Since workers 
are more likely to have spells of temp work later in the sample period, this evidently reﬂects the 
fact that those who work as temps tend to have lower wage time slopes in addition to lower wage 
levels.
Controlling for individual-speciﬁc constants and time trends greatly reduces the magnitude of the 
estimated wage differential associated with temp work. However, a log wage penalty of over 15% 
would, in the context of the standard competitive model of compensating differences, imply a sig-
niﬁcant positive amenity related to faster human capital acquisition or some other factor. The esti-
mated wage differential is also considerably higher than those we obtained using CPS data in our 
previous work (Segal and Sullivan (1997)). This would be consistent with major biases due to 
measurement error in our previous work. In addition, some of the difference may be due to differ-
ences between Washington State and the rest of the nation, a factor hinted at by the high unad-
justed differential obtained from model (1).
Estimates based on model (3) show that temp wage rates are considerably lower than might have 
been expected based on trends observed earlier and later in workers’ careers. However, anecdotal 
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yijt ai bt q1A
it q2A
it
2 ¼e ijt +++ + + =
Ait it b i Ait tb i - =
yijt ai¢b t¢ 2q2bit -¼ e ijt ++ + =
g10
and other evidence suggests that workers frequently turn to temp work after having suffering 
some career setback such as loss of a job due to a layoff or plant closing.13 Such events may be 
associated with substantial reductions in wages and earnings that would not reﬂect temp work per 
se, but the circumstances that led them to accept temp work.14 In this case, the trends observed at 
times signiﬁcantly removed from the dates at which workers take temp jobs may not yield a valid 
comparison.
One way to begin to this issue is to allow for “effects” of temp work in periods immediately 
before and after their spells of temp work.To keep things relatively simple, we eliminated from 
our sample workers who had more than one spell of temp work, where a temp spell is deﬁned as a 
sequence of consecutive quarters in which a worker held at least one temp job. The right hand col-
umn of Table 2 shows the effect of this sample restriction on the estimates of the models we have 
already discussed. For the individual-speciﬁc trends speciﬁcation, the estimate – -0.160 (with a 
standard error of 0.003) – is just slightly higher in magnitude when we limit the sample to workers 
with at most one spell of temp employment.
We then created a series of dummy variables representing the number of quarters before or after 
the temp spell,   if the quarter   is   quarters after the temp spell. If   is negative then 
 that many quarters before the temp spell starts. In particular, the dummy   in previ-
ous speciﬁcations is denoted by  . We then estimated models of the form
(6) .
The parameters   now measure the effect of temp work   quarters after the temp spell. The 
model is identiﬁed by the assumption that   in period more than eight quarters removed 
from the temp work spell. 
13. For example, Farber (1998) ﬁnds that workers reporting displacement in the 1994 Displaced Worker 
Supplement to the CPS are somewhat more likely to report being temps in a matched extract from the 1995 
Contingent Worker CPS Supplement.
14. Evidence on the adverse consequences of job displacement can be found in, for example, Topel (1990), 
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Estimates of the   for   to   are plotted in Figure 2. Several features of the plot are 
notable. First, the estimates of the wage differential associated with periods immediately before 
and after temp work are negative. This indicates that these periods are associated with events lead-
ing to workers’ having lower wages even when they are not working as temps. These effects tend 
to zero as the period is further removed from the time of the temp spell.15 This suggests that the 
choice of an eight quarter “window” in model (6) is not particularly restrictive. Indeed we obtain 
very similar results with windows of six or ten quarters. Second, the estimate associated with 
temp quarters themselves (shown in the top left of Table 3) is slightly larger in magnitude than 
that based on model (3) – -0.161 (.004) versus -0.160 (.003). This is because the quarters of non-
temp work that are inside the eight quarter window, during which wages tend to be lower, are 
removed from the effective comparison group. However, when we compare the temp work indica-
tor coefﬁcients to the coefﬁcients for the quarter before and the quarter after temp work, the dif-
ference is smaller than the simple estimate based on model (3). 
A simple, upper bound estimate of the true wage differential associated with temp work taking 
account the special circumstances in which workers accept temp jobs is 
, the difference between the coefﬁcients on the temp work indicator and 
the average of the quarters right around the temp work spell. This quantity is an upper bound for 
the magnitude of the temp work effect because the   coefﬁcients become more negative as   
approaches zero. Thus using   rather than the theoretically preferable, but unobservable, 
, understates the size of the drop in non-temp wages that would have occurred in the quar-
ters workers accept temp jobs. The estimate of   based on model (6) is -0.140 (.005).
Model (6) assumes that the temp work wage differential is constant over time. This assumption is 
relaxed in the model whose estimates are shown in the second column of Table 3 (labeled Model 
(6a)). In this speciﬁcation a time trend is interacted with the temp job indicator so that the indica-
tor coefﬁcient measures the differential in the ﬁrst quarter of temp work and the coefﬁcient on the 
time trend interaction shows by how much the differential changes each additional quarter the 
temp spell lasts. The estimates indicate that the differential tends to be larger at the beginning of 
temp spells, shrinking about 1.4 percentage points each quarter the job lasts. At such a rate it 
15. This effect is clearer in Figure 3, which as we discuss below is based on a richer speciﬁcation that more 
satisfactorily represents the data.
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would still take several years of temp work before the differential shrunk to zero. The fact that the 
temp work wage differential shrinks as temp spells last longer is also consistent with the fact that 
the differential increased when we limited the sample to workers with at most one temp work 
spell.
We argued that   was likely an over estimate of the temp wage differen-
tial after taking into account the circumstances that lead to workers accepting temp jobs because 
the temp wage effect in non-temp work period was increasing as the quarter approached the temp 
period. To get an estimate of where workers wages in other jobs were headed in the temp period, 
we added an indicator for a job being a “new perm job” – that is, for the job being outside the tem-
porary services industry and having begun during the period the worker was a temp. We excluded 
continuing perm jobs because they likely would have included many jobs temps would have 
recently been forced to leave and thus would not be indicative of the kind of jobs temp workers 
would have been able to get.
Results of adding this indicator are shown in the third column of Table 3; in the fourth column the 
interactions of time trends with the temp and new perm indicators are included. For the latter, Fig-
ure 3 also plots the new estimates of the   coefﬁcients, adding the level of the new perm coefﬁ-
cient to the plot. As can be seen, when the new perm indicator is added to the model, the estimates 
of the temp indicator increase in magnitude. This is because the perm jobs that are taken out of the 
comparison group – those beginning during the quarters of the temp spell – are ones of abnor-
mally low wages. Indeed, the coefﬁcient on the new perm indicator in the last column is -0.111 
(.006), indicating that perm jobs begun in the same quarters workers were employed in the tempo-
rary services industry were about 11% below expectations based on trends in the periods before 
and after temp work.
The difference between the temp work indicator and the new perm indicator – -0.107 (.006) 
would seem to be a reasonable estimate of the true temp wage differential once account is taken of 
the special circumstances likely surrounding the period of workers’ employment in the temporary 
services industry. The coefﬁcients on the time trend interactions indicate that the differentials 
between both temp jobs and new perm jobs and what would have been expected on the basis of 
period outside the eight quarter window shrink over time. The differential closes very slightly 
g ˜
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more slowly – 0.134 (.0017) versus 0.139 (.0045) for temp jobs than new perm jobs, a difference 
that is marginally statistically signiﬁcant.
IV. Conclusion
We found that there is a deﬁnite negative wage differential associated with temp work. This is true 
even after we control for worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and time trends. Comparing temp wages to 
what would have been expected on the basis of wages trends at other times in workers’ careers 
suggests a differential of 15% to 20%. But, up to half of this effect appears to be due to factors 
associated with temp work rather than to temp work per se. When we compare temp wages to 
more reasonable indicators of the non-temp opportunities temp workers might have had, the dif-
ferential is only around 10%.
Of course, even a wage penalty of 10% is quite signiﬁcant. Interpreted in terms of the competitive 
theory of compensating differentials, it would indicate that temps signiﬁcantly value the increased 
opportunity to acquire human capital or some other non-wage aspect of temp work, especially 
given the increased risk of unemployment that it entails. Alternatively, the wage penalty may be a 
manifestation of temp workers’ lack of bargaining power.14
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a. Average of October, November, and December.
b. In 1,000s
c. In percent of employment.
d. Percentage growth
e. Change in share
Table 1: Temporary services employment levels and shares, U.S. and Washington State
Period
Washington State Total U.S.a
Employmentb Sharec Employment Share
1984:Q4 17.04 0.95 674.00 0.70
1985:Q4 20.03 1.0913 773.67 0.79
1986:Q4 21.92 1.1422 880.33 0.88
1987:Q4 32.08 1.4898 1045.00 1.01
1988:Q4 34.32 1.5969 1137.33 1.09
1989:Q4 41.34 1.7345 1236.33 1.14
1990:Q4 43.67 1.7578 1279.33 1.17
1991:Q4 40.91 1.6334 1300.00 1.20
1992:Q4 44.59 1.7688 1494.33 1.37
1993:Q4 49.14 1.8855 1785.33 1.60
1994:Q4 60.14 2.24 2125.00 1.84
1984:Q4 to 1994:Q4 253%d 1.29e 215% 1.1417
Table 2: Estimates of the temp log wage differential – temp dummy only
Control variables Full sample Workers with at 











Quarter dummies, worker ﬁxed 






a. Sample restricted to workers with at most one temp spell. All model include quarter- speciﬁc 
ﬁxed effects and worker-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and time trends.
Table 3: Estimates of log wage effectsa
Variable Model (6) Model (6a) Model 
(6b) Model (6c)




































Perm job slope 0.0139
(.005)
Temp job indicator minus average 
















Figure 1: Employment share of Temporary Services, monthly U.S. and quarterly Washing-
ton State
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Figure 2: Estimates of temp effect in period before and after temp work
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Figure 3: Estimates of temp effect in quarters before and after temp work 
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